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HERBERT D. LAUBE t
Just a century has passed since the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
decided the celebrated case of Britton. v. Turner.1 The plaintiff, who had
agreed to work for the defendant for a year for $120, voluntarily abandoned
his contract at the end of ten months. There was no evidence that the fail-
ure of the plaintiff to fulfill his contract caused ahy damage to the defendant.
Although guilty of a deliberate default, the plaintiff was allowed by -the
court a quasi-contractual recovery for the services which he had rendered.
For a hundred years, this famous case has been a source of controversy.2
Its cogent reasoning has been commended even by courts which have
refused to follow it.3 Although courts which have adopted the opposite
view have been slow to change their position, it has been predicted that the
manifest justice of its doctrine will grow in favor until it is universally
recognized.4 One court, although not disposed to dispute the equity of
the decision, was not prepared to make so radical a change in the legal effect
of entire contracts-a change which should originate with the legislature
and not the judiciary.5 To another court, its more humane doctrine seems
to have supplanted the common law doctrine.6 At least, it is often believed
t B. L., 19o3, University of Wisconsin; A. M., i911, University of Michigan; LL B.,
i96, Columbia University; S. J. D., i924, Harvard University; editor, WOODRUFF, CASES ON
QuAsi CONTRAcTS (3d ed. 1933) ; Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. 6 N. H. 481 (1834).
2. Clearly, it marked a departure from the technical rule of common law. Parcell v. Mc-
Comber, it Neb. 209, 211, 7 N. W. 529, 530 (1881) ; Note (i88i) 26 AM. DEC. 722.
3. Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, i85 (x858) ; Thurston v. Nutter, 125 Me. 411, 417, 134
Atl. 5o6, 5o8 (ig26). See also Lynn v. Seby, 29 N. D. 420, 424, 151 N. W. 3, 32 (915);
Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex. Supp. 456 (i86o) ; Notes (i88o) i9 AM. DEc. 272; (188i) 26 Am.
DEc. 722.
4. Flmw, DAMAGES (876) § 335; Note L. R. A. i9i6E 790, 812.
5. Larkin v. Buck, ii Ohio St. 56i, 568 (186o). Accord: Timberlake v. Thayer, 71 Miss.
279, 281, 14 So. 446 (1893).
6. Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 554, 127 N. E. 81g, 821 (92o).
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to have the support of the majority of the later cases,7 notably among the
western states. s
On the other hand, Britton v. Turner has been considered "so far from
being founded on the law" as to be "an evasion of all law", 9 contrary to the
current of authority both in America and England, and certainly against
reason.' 0 Ashley says that it is generally regarded that the case was incor-
rectly decided and to discuss it from a quasi-contractual point of view merely
leads to confusion, since no quasi-contractual obligation is involved, After
a careful analysis of the grounds set forth in the opinion, Woodward con-
cludes that considerations both of justice and policy forbid its approval.'
2
Admittedly, the best jurists and the ablest legal thinkers have differed
radically as to its merits. 3  Justice Dillon has said:
"That celebrated case has been criticized, doubted and denied to be
sound. It is frequently said to be good equity,' 4 but bad law. Yet its
principles have been gradually winning their way into professional and
judicial favor. It is bottomed on justice, and is right upon principle,
however it may be upon the technical and more illiberal rules of the
common law, as found in the older cases." 15
The effective formulation of its defects by Woodward has had a marked
influence upon current legal thought. Perhaps the weakness of Woodward's
classical criticism is that it is based largely upon the conventional principles
of contracts. One may justify the result which the court reached, although
its rationalization of it may have been defective. A rationalization may be
made upon irrational grounds,' 6 for the test of rationality is merely the habit
of taking into account all the relevant evidence.' 7 The validity of a conclu-
sion can not be determined by a rule of common law for that rule may be
based upon an erroneous presupposition. The irreconcilable conflict between
Woodward and Dillon may be explained on that basis. The vitality of that
conflict in modern social philosophy is exemplified by the fact that in the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts the American Law Institute has re-
vived the common law rule, in spite of the fact that the tendency of labor
legislation for a generation has been to nullify it.
7. Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99, 1O5 (1878); Murphy v. Sampson, 2 Neb. (unof.) 297,
298, 96 N. W. 494 (1902). See also Note (i924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 885, 889.
8. See Parcell v. McComber, In Neb. 209, 212, 7 N. W. 529, 530 (i88i).
9. Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 1O2, 1O3 (1852).
io. Diffenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 465 (1883). But see Lynn v. Seby, 29 N. D. 420,
424, 151 N. W. 31, 32 (1915).
ii. Ashley, Britton v. Turner (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 544.
12. WooDWARD, QUASI CoNTRAcrs (1913) § 172.
13. McClay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa 66, 67 (1864).
14. Roundy v. Thatcher, 49 N. H. 526, 530 (187o) ; Bedow v. Tonkin, 5 S. D. 432, 437,
59 N. W. 222, 223 (1894).
I. McClay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa 66, 68 (1864).
16. THoummss, STRAIGHT AND CRooKED THINKING (1932) 205.
17. RUSSELL, SCEPTICAL ESSAYS (1928) 46.
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The Condition Precedent
It is a rule of common law that where an entire service is to be per-
formed for an entire compensation to be paid at its completion, the perform-
ance of the service is a condition precedent to the recovery of the compen-
sation.:' "This", says Parsons, "is an old and deep-rooted principle of the
common law, and though it sometimes has the appearance of harshness, it
would be difficult to contend against it upon principle." 19 For part per-
formance there can be no recovery. To permit recovery would be to violate
the very "nature of entire contracts." 20
This theory has had an artificial influence on personal service con-
tracts.21 So inexorable has the rule relating to the condition precedent been
regarded in Alabama that it has been held that where a servant hired for a
term died before full performance, no recovery could be had by his adminis-
tratrix for the wages earned at the time of his death. 22  Ten years later, the
Alabama Code nullified the decision and allowed pro rata compensation for
services, notwithstanding the entirety of the contract.23 Generally, courts
grant relief in such cases.
24
One needs only to turn to the dissenting decision in Fenton v. Clark 25
to observe how warped the judicial mind may become in its devotion to "a
rigid scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions." 26 In that case, Red-
field, J., dissenting, said:
"It is true, no doubt, in the present case, that the plaintiff did not
anticipate being hindered from the performance of his contract by
sickness. But knowing that such might be the case, it was his own folly
not to provide against such a contingency .... Under these circum-
18. See Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102, o5 (1852).
19. 2 PARsoNs, CONTRACrS (9th ed. 1853) *521. For Lord Mansfield's formulation of the
rule, see Boone v. Eyre, i H. BI. 273 n. (K. B. 1789). See also, Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H.
481, 493; Wr.ISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAw (1929) 21. In Philbrook v.
Belknap, 6 Vt. 383, 385 (834), Phelps, J., observed:
"The subject of dependent and independent covenants, or promises, is much per-
plexed, and so much ingenuity and learning have been expended upon it, that, like some
other branches of the law, it seems to be involved in a sort of artificial embarrassment."
2o. Note (i88o) ig Am. DC. 272.
21. Hulle v. Heightman, 2 East 145 (K. B. i8o2). See also Towers v. Barrett, I T. R.
133 (K. B. 1786).
22. Givhan v. Dailey's Adm'x, 4 Ala. 336 (1842). Cutter v. Powell, 6 T. P- 320 (K. B.
1795), much cited by American courts, has often been said to sustain this proposition, although
it appears to have been decided on the basis of a peculiar provision of the contract. See also
Posey v. Garth, 7 Mo. 94, 97 (1841 ) ; Note (924) 24 CoL L. REV. 885, 890; WOOD, MAs-
IER AND SERVANT (2d ed. i886) I70.
23. Martin v. Massie, 127 Ala. 504, 510, 29 So. 31, 33 (900).
24. Note (1924) 24 Co- L. REv. 885, 888. However, as late as 1922, it was necessary
for the New Hampshire court to say: "It is not important whether the obligation to make
compensation in cases like this is called quasi contract or some other appropriate designation.
The important thing is that the law of this state is that in such a situation there is right to
compensation and a duty to pay." Stanley v. Kimball, 8o N. H. 431, 434, 1I8 Atl. 636, 637
(19"2).
25. Il Vt. 557 (1839).
26. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (igo8) 8 CoT. L. REv. 6o5, 6o8.
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stances, I see no more reason to allow the plaintiff to recover for part
performance, than exists in almost all cases of this character, where,
from some accident, the situation of affairs becomes changed, and it is
inconvenient for the party to perform his contract. If a condition prece-
dent is to be got rid of thus readily, they are not made of such 'stem
stuff' as we have been taught to consider them." 27
Such legal thinking suffers from its own sterility, which a lively sense of
reality should have precluded. Its limitation is the imaginary barrier of
conventional thought about the condition precedent.
Britton v. Turner was the first case 28 to ignore the common law doc-
trine and to allow an employee who had failed, without cause, to perform
the service which he had engaged to perform, to recover its reasonable value.
How shocking such an innovation was, the words of Lincoln, J., pronounced
a decade before, reveal.
"It cannot but seem strange to those who are in any degree familiar
with the fundamental principles of law, that doubts should ever have
been entertained upon a question of this nature. . . . And it is no less
repugnant to the well established rules of civil jurisprudence, than to
the dictates of moral sense, that a party who deliberately and under-
standingly enters into an engagement and voluntarily breaks it, should
be permitted to make that very engagement the foundation of a claim
to compensation for services under it." 29
Yet the New Hampshire court reached an opposite conclusion, fully realizing
that it was contrary to the well settled rule of law on the subject. 0
Measure of Damages
Field has observed that courts have been driven to some ingenuity
for arguments to overcome the mere technical objections to the liberal doc-
trine of Britton v. Turner, although the hardship of the common law rule
was, in many cases, so manifest. It is difficult to understand why any
ingenuity was required to expose the fallacy of the common law rule. Its
glaring defect is self-evident. An indefensible pronouncement, like that of
the Maine court in Miller v. Goddard, would seem to be its own condem-
nation.
"If the defendant discharged the plaintiff before the expiration of
the time for which he was employed, without justifiable cause, the
plaintiff will be entitled to recover all the damages, which he has sus-
tained, by the breach of contract; but if the plaintiff has departed from
it, without justifiable cause, he cannot recover anything." 31
27. At 567. See also Appleby v. Dods, 8 East 300 (K. B. 1807).
28. Note L. R. A. xI916E 79o, 8io.
29. Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 271 (Mass. 1824).
30. 6 N. H. at 486.
31. 34 Me. io2, io7 (1852).
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When the employee leaves the service before the end of his term without
cause, he loses his right to the wages he has earned although the employer
has suffered no damages. But if the employer is guilty of a breach of the
same contract, he is liable only for the damages which result. Such an
artificial distinction 32 seems to persist only because familiarity with the
traditional rule has blinded the profession to its indefensible social impli-
cations. Yet Ashley says that Britton v. Turner lays down a false rule for
the measure of recovery by an employee who is guilty of default.33
Woodward has declared that to allow the employer to retain a sum in
excess of adequate compensatory damages for the breach is perhaps the
strongest argument that can be urged against the rule. But the hardship
to the employee seems to him to be outweighed distinctly by the considera-
tion that the denial of relief must have a salutary effect in discouraging the
wilful breach of contracts.34  It is remarkable that the only case 35 which
seems to have noted the unsoundness of the application of different rules of
recovery for employer and employee was decided in Minnesota in 1864,
fifty years before Woodward's classic volume on quasi-contracts was pub-
lished. The illuminating observation of the court on such indefensible
discrimination between employee and employer makes Ashley's attempt to
solve on the basis of implied conditions the problem which confronted the
court in Britton v. Turner seem as artificial as the usual attempt to defeat
recovery by the theory of conditions precedent.
The rule of recovery laid down in Britton v. Turner was:
"The benefit and advantage which the party takes by the labor,
therefore, is the amount of value which he receives, if any, after deduct-
ing the amount of damage; . . . the implied promise which the law will
raise, in such case, is to pay such amount of the stipulated price for
the whole labor, as remains after deducting what it would cost to pro-
cure a completion of the residue of the service, and also any damage
which has been sustained by reason of the non fulfilment of the con-
tract." 36
Why is this rule not equitable? If the employer dismisses his employee
before the end of his term of service, the employee can not remain idle.ST
It is incumbent upon the injured party to do whatever he can to lessen the
injury. The employee is entitled only to actual indemnity.38 The damages
32. "The human mind is not content with a distinction that rests on no substantial dif-
ference." Stone, C. J., in Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 1IO, 113, 5 So. 497, 498 (889). See also
OGDEN, MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 230.
33. Supra note ii at 546.
34. WOODWARD, QuASI CONTRACTS (1913) § 169 (b).
35. Williams v. Anderson, 9 Minn. 50, 54 (1864).
36. 6 N. H. at 494.
37. See Howard v. Daly, 6I N. Y. 362, 370 (1875), cited infra note 40; Chamberlain v.
Morgan, 68 Pa. 168, 169 (1871).
38. Note (i9o7) 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49, 84.
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recovered against the employer must be reduced, not only by sums which
the employee has earned in the meantime, but by what he might have earned
by due diligence.3 9  Society is interested in the industry of its members. It
is the duty of the employee to reduce damages inflicted by his wrongful dis-
charge by using due diligence to secure employment elsewhere.40  States
which deny the defaulting employee the right to recover any wages praise the
wisdom of the rule which protects the defaulting employer.41
Some courts have felt that the rule established in Britton v. Turner
would be quite inadequate to indemnify the employer in most cases. 42  To
allow a defaulting employee to recover seemed to Keener to be a clear usurpa-
tion on the part of the court.43 The effective answer to that position is that
the courts which have defeated the right of the defaulting employee to
recover have done so by a rule of their own creation. Of course, one should
not be able to profit by his own wrong; 44 he who injures another should
compensate him to the extent of that injury.43 But to surcharge the default-
ing employee under the guise of social welfare signifies a confused social
outlook.
The friction between employers and employees upon industrial ques-
tions can be eliminated only when these questions are approached from a
social point of view.48  Although "justice between man and man" has been
regarded as a "vague jurisprudence . . . attractively styled", 47 yet one can
not condemn Gompers, as a leader of labor in search of industrial justice,
for refusing to seek the definition of it in "befogged legal opinions",48 in
the light of the decisions which oppose Britton v. Turner. In Harriston v.
Sale counsel urged that it was a well settled rule of law that if an employee
abandons his contract, he can not recover. He added:
"If this be a settled rule of law it is a settled rule of justice; for, to the
mind at all acquainted with or informed as to the true nature of our
jurisprudence, a distinction between a rule of law and a rule of justice
would seem to be absurd." 49
39. Mount Hope Cemetery Ass'n v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67, 79, 28 N. E. 834, 836
(1891).
40. SEn)GwiCK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 667.
41. Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72, 76 (1863) ; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 370
(1875). See also Note (19o7) 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49, 94, IOO.
42. Diffenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 465 (1883) ; see M'Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns.
165, 167 (N. Y. 1815). Contra: 2 PARSONS, CONTRACrS (Ist ed. 1853) *39. Cf. Ballantine,
Forfeiture for Breach of Contract (1921) 5 MINN. L. REV. 329, 341.
43. KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTs (1893) 222.
44. Kitchen v. Hill, 215 Mich. 668, 672, 184 N. W. 465, 467 (1921).
45. State v. Skinner, 25 N. C. 564, 567 (1843).
46. HowERTH, LIFE AND WoRK (1913) 51.
47. Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] I Ch. 127, 14o.
48. GomPERs, LABOR AND THE EmIPLoYER (1920) 3.
49. 14 Miss. 634, 637 (1846).
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Such an argument merely indicates that tradition and authority may be
arrayed against justice.50 However, it is clear that the human race can not
forever exist half-exploiter and half-exploited, even under the sanction of
law.
51
The Moral Issue
The court in Britton v. Turner is said to have overlooked the principle
that no person has any right to recover compensation under a special contract
unless he has at least attempted in good faith to perform all of its condi-
tions.5 2  According to Metfalf, in 1867 all known decisions excepting one
conformed to this principle. 53 In Stark v. Parker, the court declared that
to hold otherwise would be "a flagrant violation of the first principles of
justice." 54 The security of public and private morality is believed to be
dependent upon the observance of contract obligation. 5 The law regarding
the sanctity of contract is said to rest upon a solid foundation of reason and
justice which public policy supports.
56
But Ashley thought that to criticize Britton v. Turner because the plain-
tiff voluntarily committed a breach of his contract was to proceed upon a
lame ground.57 It would seem a fictitious devotion to morality. To require
a restitution of benefits does not encourage breach of contracts with im-
punity.58 To permit the employer to recoup the damages he has suffered
by set off is to enforce the principle of reparation. He who is required to
repair the damage he has done, does not violate his contract with impunity.59
Reparation by the defaulting employee, and not enrichment by the employer,
is the principle of substantial justice. The tearful utterances about the
sacredness of solemn contracts is but the patter of solemn nonsense. They
indicate an overzealous apprehension. 0 Although the venerable history of
the condition precedent has enshrined it as a principle of justice, it now
seems crudely superficial.
61
50. RUSSE I, PRINcIPLES OF SOCIAL REcoNsTRuc IoN (1916) 26. See also Pound, Liberty
of Contract (igog) i8 YALE L. J. 454, 463.
5I. FoRD, My LIFE AND WORK (1923) 244.
52. Veazie v. City of Bangor, 51 Me. 509, 513 (1863).
53. MLTCAL, CONTRACTS (I867) 8.
54. 2 Pick. 267, 274 (Mass. 1824).
55. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montana Light & Water Co., 171 Fed. 553, 561
(M. D. Ala. 19O9).
56. Second Nat. Bank v. Samuel & Sons, 12 F. (2d) 963, 966 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Thur-
ston v. Nutter, 125 Me. 411, 418, 134 Atl. 5o6, 508 (1926) ; Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, I86
(1858).
57. Supra note II, at 547.
58. "The law should consider the degree of moral delinquency, the extent of non-per-
formance, and the ratio of damages to benefit received." Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach
of Contract (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 329, 334.
59. Cf. Hughes v. Cannon, 33 Tenn. 622, 627 (1854). See also Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord,
246, 248 (S. C. 1827).
6o. Note (1924) 24 Cor- L. REv. 885, 89o.
61. See Combe v. Edwards, 3 P. D. io3, 142 (1878).
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Ashley would allow the recovery of the employee to rest upon the
strength or weakness of the employer's case. 62  At any rate, it is clear that
one can not teach morality to men merely to exploit them.63  The context
of a word acquires meaning from experience. 4 Morality is not a phantom
to be linguistically generated. The pages of Blackstone applaud those regu-
lations which punish laborers for deserting their work.65 Today, employee
and employer alike are at liberty to renounce their contracts, subject to the
legal consequences which attach to the renunciation. 66 But what morality
prescribes that those consequences should be different? A Missouri court
has said in denying relief to an employee who voluntarily quit his employ-
ment:
"There is no hardship to parties in being held to their contracts.
Fair dealing between man and man seems to require that a person should
be aware that a wilful violation of his own obligations releases the other
party to the contract from corresponding obligations. No rule of ethics
seems to demand that persons should be released from forfeitures
wantonly and wilfully incurred." 6'
Two fallacies vitiate this pronouncement. The recovery of a defaulting
employee is not upon the contract, but in quasi-contract.Gs The law im-
poses the obligation in spite of the breach. Secondly, the ethical conception
of the court has no factual foundation.
The most effective repudiation of the attitude of the Missouri court
is to be found in an old Scottish case, where the fault lay with the em-
ployer. The judge who delivered the opinion felt keenly the responsibility of
the employer. He said:
"The servant, on such occasions, suffers a severe disappointment, under-
goes a sort of indignity and humiliation, and is exposed to the risk
of a loss of character; and it seems to be no more than just, that for
these injuries some allowance should be made him; and that something
should even be added, in the way of censure, and for the sake of exam-
ple, just as against the servant in the opposite case, as in a matter of
police in some measure, and a thing of such frequent occurrence." 69
The opinion then ironically concludes that the Bench did not agree with these
notions on this subject. The Bench did not favor taking the same punitive
measure against employers as were employed in dealing with employees. A
dual morality precluded social justice.
62. Supra note ii, at 548.
63. FoRD, My LIFE AND WORK (1923) 255.
64. OGDEN AND RicnARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING (1930) 175, 248.
65. I BT. Comm. *427.
66. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1913) 638.
67. Gruetzner v. Aude Furniture Co., 28 Mo. App. 263, 267 (1887).
68. Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 885, 889.
69. Stuart v. Richardson, Hume 390, 391 (Scot. i8o6).
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Punitive Damages
Vindictive or punitive damages can not be allowed for a mere breach
of contract. 70 In Missouri, where a defaulting employee can recover noth-
ing, it is error to award punitive damages against an employer who has
breached his contract. 71
"The cardinal rule in the assessment of damages for the violation
of a contract is actual compensation to the injured party. Punitive
damages are unknown to the law of private contracts and will not be
awarded even when the parties stipulate for them." 72
It is error for the court to instruct the jury that they may allow damages for
violation of faith. The violation of most contracts involves a breach of
faith. If the promisor must respond in damages for the violation of faith
as well as for the violation of his promise, he must make duplicate satisfac-
tion.
7 3
Liability for breach of contract is not concerned ordinarily with mo-
tives.7 4  Where an employer wrongfully discharged his employee, the North
Carolina court said:
"It would seem to be a dictate of reason that if one party to a con-
tract be injured by a breach of it by the other, he ought to be put into
the same condition as if the contract had been fully performed on both
sides. He certainly ought not to be a loser by the fault of the other;
nor can he be a gainer without introducing into a broken contract the
idea of something like vindictive damages. The true rule then is, to
give him neither more nor less than the damages which he has actually
sustained, and so we find the authorities to be . . . . 75
Yet Williston says that where an employee wilfully defaults he should re-
cover nothing.76  Compensatory damages are deemed adequate in the law
of contracts 77 and particularly for the violation of a contract by the em-
ployer. His motives are not to be considered in awarding damages. But
to deny a defaulting employee all relief has a salutary effect in discouraging
a breach of contract. Such a profane mixture of law and morals is clearly
sophistry.
70. Guildford v. Anglo-French Steamship Co., 9 Can. Sup. Ct. 303, 309 (1883) ; Richard-
son v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 126 N. C. oo, 102, 35 S. E. 235 (igoo) ; Gordon v. Brewster,
7 Wis. 355, 363 (1858).
71. Puller v. Royal Casualty Co., 271 Mo. 369, 196 S. W. 755 (1917).
72. Norris v. Letchworth, 167 Mo. App. 553, 557, 152 S. W. 421, 423 (1912). Cf. Monk-
ton v. Shepardson, 3 Per. & Day. 182, 185, 18 L. J. R. (N. s.) 134 (Q. B. 1840).
73. Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 1o (1859) ; see Hood v. Moffett, lo9 Miss. 757, 767, 69
So. 664, 666 (1915).
74. Horton's Estate v. Sherwin, 63 Okla. 259, 26o, 164 Pac. 469, 47o (1917) ; Welborn
v. Dixon, 7o S. C. loS, 115, 49 S. E. 232, 235 (1904) ; SUTHERLND, DMAGES (3d ed. 19o3)
§ 390.
75. Hendrickson v. Anderson, 5o N. C. 246, 249 (I858).
76. 3 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1477.
77. 6 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1922) § 3183. See also Note ANN. CAs. I9I7E 412.
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Penalties and Forfeitures
To chancery fell the task of moulding penalties and forfeitures to hu-
mane standards of conduct. Equity will permit no advantage to be taken
of a penalty or forfeiture, where compensation can be made.7
"There is no more intrinsic sanctity in stipulations by contract than
in other solemn acts of parties which are constantly interfered with by
Courts of Equity upon the broad ground of public policy or the pure
principles of natural justice." 79
Courts of law as well as courts of equity are at liberty to disregard express
conditions where they are harsh or penal.8 0 The law as a science would be
unworthy of its name if it did not provide, to some extent, means of pre-
venting the mischiefs of improvidence and rashness on the one side and of
avarice and cunning on the other.8 '
Where, by the terms of the agreement, the measure of damage sustained
by non-performance is "not so excessive as to shock the moral sense" of
the court, the parties will be be bound by their contract.8 2 In a sense, "liqui-
dated damages" is a mere phrase. One who maintains that men have a
right to stipulate for liquidated damages regardless of the disproportion to
the sum resulting from the breach of contract, mistakes the object and the
temper of the law.8 3  The common law was not so tolerant, but a statute
in the fourth year of the reign of Anne 84 incorporated in it the principles of
equity.
The dislike of the courts for forfeitures has led many of them to feel
that justice can be done more exactly by giving a right of action in quasi-
contract to a plaintiff who is in default.85 In Louisiana, a contract which
stipulates that the employee shall forfeit his wages on discharge is made
unlawful by statute.88  Even where the contract may legally provide that
the servant shall forfeit his wages if he fails to comply with its terms, the
forfeiture can be enforced only to the extent of the damages which were
inflicted.8 7  A provision forfeiting all wages which may be due at the time
78. FRANCIS, MAXIms OF EQUITY (1791) Maxim XII.
79. 2 STORY, FQurry JURISPRUDENCE (I4th ed. 1918) § 1728; see Loyd, Penalties and
Forfeitures (1915) 29 HARv. L. Rsv. 117, 126.
8o. Ballantine, supra note 42, at 342.
81. 2 STORY, loc. cit. supra note 79.
82. Dunn v. Morgenthau, 73 App. Div. 147, 148, 76 N. Y. Supp. 827, 829 (Ist Dep't 19o2);
aff'd, 175 N. Y. 518, 67 N. E. io8i (1903). See also SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (3d ed. 1903)
§ 292.
83. Bayse v. Ambrose, 28 Mo. 39, 41 (x859), quoted with approval by SUTHERLAND, op.
cit. supra note 82, at 721. See also Willson v. Mayor, 83 Md. 2o3, 211, 34 Atl. 774, 777
(1896) ; Advance Amusement Co. v. Franke, 269 Ill. 579, 581, 1o9 N. E. 471, 472 (I915).
84. 4 & 5 ANNE C. 16, §§ 12, 13 (1705) ; cf. 8 & 9 WILL. III, c. II, §8 (1696-1697).
85. 6 PAGE, CoNTRACTs (1922) § 3261.
86. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart 1932) § 4362.
87. Lee v. Davis, 5 Ky. Op. 617, 618 (1871) ; cf. Gateway Produce Co. v. Davis, 228 S.
W. 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; see Ressig v. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co., 185 App. Div. 4, 9,
172 N. Y. Supp. 6x6, 61g (ist Dep't 1918) ; aff'd, 229 N. Y. 553, 129 N. E. 912 (192o).
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of leaving, if the employee leaves without notice, will not be enforced because
it is harsh and oppressive.88
In Britton v. Turner, the court believed that the rule which denied relief
to the defaulting employee would operate very unequally among employees.8 9
One who attempted to perform would be placed in a much worse position
than one who wholly disregarded his contract. The employer would receive
much more by the breach of the contract than he would be entitled to in an
action for damages. To Keener it seemed a novel suggestion that because
the damage was small the person who had done the injury could acquire by
his default a right against the person injuredY0 If the rule operates un-
equally, says Woodward, it is regrettable, but "one whose hands are soiled
by wilful wrongdoing is hardly in a position seriously to complain." 91 How-
ever, courts, which abhor forfeitures under the label of "liquidated dam-
ages" for breach of contract, have refused to allow defaulting employees
to recover for their services. 92  To invoke morality to bar the one and to
ignore it to do justice to the other would seem merely to "splash solemnly
about in the vocabulary of ambiguity."
Lantry v. Parks 93 established the rule in New York that an employee
who has violated his contract has failed to perform the condition precedent
to recovery. The plaintiff had agreed to work for the defendant for one
year at ten dollars a month. After serving ten and one-half months, he
left the employment. He left on Saturday and returned on Monday and
offered to resume his work, but the defendant would employ him no longer.
Clearly, where a laborer's wages amount to only $12o a year, forfeiture of
wages for ten months and a half must have been highly disproportionate
to the damages which the violation of his contract inflicted.94 The Vermont
court, which has rigidly enforced the rule of condition precedent against de-
faulting employees, has regarded Lantry v. Parks as an excellent illustration
of the manifest injustice which can be done by a refusal to apportion the
wages of laborers who are hired for a fixed period.9 5 Forfeitures involving
wages of from three to five months on contracts of employment ranging
from four months to a year have been common.96
88. Ballantine, supra note 42, at 343.
89. 6 N. H. at 486. Cf. argument of counsel in Huttman v. Boulnois, 2 C. & P. 51o, 511
(K. B. 1826).
90. Op. cit. supra note 43, at 221.
91. Op. cit. mepra note 12, § 168 (a).
92. Note (1924) 24 Co. L. REv. 885.
93. 8 Cow. 63 (N. Y. 1827).
94. In Pettigrew v. Bishop, 3 Ala. 44o (1842), the defaulting employee forfeited eleven
months' wages. In Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98, lol, 1O2 (1886), the court held the con-
tract to be divisible, in order to avoid a forfeiture.
95. Fenton v. Clark, II Vt. 557, 561 (839).
96. Eldridge v. Rowe - Ill. 91 (1845) (four months out of eight months) ; Swanzey v.
Moore, 22 11. 63 (1859) (over five months out of a year) ; Angle v. Hanna, 22 Ill. 429 (1859)
(nearly 3'2 months out of 4/2 months) ; Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267 (Mass. 1824) (two
months out of a year) ; Davis v. Maxwell, 53 Mass. 286 (1847) (three months out of seven
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Personal Service Contracts
In Britton v. Turner, Mr. Justice Parker thought that the difference
between a labor contract and other contracts did not justify the application
of a different rule.97  Keener says that Mr. Justice Parker properly so
thought.98 In a case decided three years after Britton v. Turner, the Massa-
chusetts court said that to admit of any exception in favor of any class would
violate elementary principles of law.
"Laborers, and especially that most improvident part of them, sailors,
may excite sympathy; but in a government of equal laws, they must be
subject to the same rules and principles as the rest of the community;
and a court of justice is almost the only place where sympathy should
have no influence." 99
Certainly the laborer ought to be subject to the same rule of law as his
employer, if the application of the rule produces the same results so that the
rule operates equally.
"Under the doctrine that the contract is entire, and its performance
a condition precedent, the result is, that if the laborer fails to fulfill his
contract, but for a single day, he forfeits all that he has done, and in
case of what he esteems maltreatment, he must submit to it, or leave
his employer, not only subject to answer for such damages as may be
sustained, but even at the peril of forfeiting all former earnings, in case
it should be found . . . that he left the service without sufficient cause.
This forfeiture may be ten, or even a hundred fold, more than sufficient
to compensate for all damages arising from a violation of the con-
tract." 100
To the Vermont court which made this pronouncement, this rule seemed no
tribute to a "government of equal laws."
Such gross injustice was a sufficient justification for distinguishing
between personal service contracts and other contracts. Although sustaining
the orthodox position in Timberlake v. Thayer,0 1 the Mississippi court felt
keenly the necessity for such a distinction. It is not sympathy but justice
that dictates that the employee shall be subjected to the same rule of damages
as is applied to the employer when he is guilty of a breach of contract. Equal-
ity lies in the application of the law. The validity of a rule of law is not
to be ascertained by its verbal form. Its meaning is derived not from its
months) ; Kohn v. Fandel, 29 Minn. 470 (1882) (7/2 weeks out of three months) ; Banse v.
Tate, 62 Mo. App. 15o (1895) (lO4 days); Hughes v. Cannon, 33 Tenn. 62z (1854) (three
months out of eight months).
97. 6 N. H. at 489.
98. Op. cit. supra note 43, at 219.
99. Olmstead v. Beale, 36 Mass. 528, 529 (1837). Cf. Diffenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462,
466 (1883).
IOO. Fenton v. Clark, I1 Vt. 557, 562 (1839).
101. 71 Miss. 279, 281, 14 So. 446, 447 (1893).
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words but from its context. The fallacy of applying the rule of the condition
precedent to both the defaulting employer and employee is that it penalizes
the latter and enriches the former under the theory of uniform application
of law.
The Vice of Uniformity
According to Dewey, the intellect is too often made a tool for a system-
atized apology for things "as they are", for a benefit that accrues to some
class, while priding itself on its ideal quality.10 2  Intellectual perversity
refuses to note the plural effects of any rule of law.103 An abstract claim
of equality often inhibits real equality. Complacent judges defend the arti-
ficial injustice of the law by formal righteousness. 04 As long as the law
looks at the substance rather than the form, formulas will not be regarded
as ends, but as means, and mathematical procedure will not inhibit the check
of consistency and common sense.105
The love of generalization often leads to useful abstraction, but fre-
quently it is attended by vicious consequences.' 06 A rule of law that can not
be applied to an employee and an employer in the same situation with like
results would seem to have little to commend it. The excellence of such
uniformity is spurious. 10 7  Its delusive exactness not only obscures its in-
humanity, 10 8 but is a source of fallacy.'0 9 The category of language can
never dominate the categories of life, although mere words may entangle
and pervert the judgment. Casuistry, says Dewey, is simply the sys-
tematic effort to secure for particular instances the advantage of a general
rule." 0  Signs and symbols must be made to signify equivalent realities."'
Constructive Service
Lord Ellenborough is generally credited 112 with the decision ".3 that
created the doctrine of "constructive service." The equitable basis of the
doctrine is obvious.
102. DEwLY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922) 258.
IO3. Id. at 229. "It must be recognized that an existing rule of law has frequently a
way of persisting even when it is reasonably certain that the rule is not the best possible.
Sometimes the forces of precedent, logic, and mere inertia due to the fact that a rule exists
defeat any effort for immediate change." WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note I, at 146.
1O4. See Forburger Stone Co. v. Lion Bonding & Surety Co., io3 Neb. 202, 210, 171 N.
W. 288 (I919).
1O5. CHADDOCx, PRNCIPLES AND MFTODS OF SrAsTIcs (1925) 87 n.
io6. Smith, Four German .urists (i895) io Poi. Scr. Q. 664, 682.
1o7. Sutherland, The Person Versus the Act in Criminology (1929) 14 CoRN. L. Q. i59,164.
io8. "The soundest industrial policy is that which, . . . when human considerations
demand it, subordinates profits to welfare. Industrial relations are essentially human rela-
tions.' RocxEFLER, PERSONAL RELATIONS IN INDUsTRY (1923) II.
1O9. Holmes, J., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342 (1921).
iIo. Op. cit. mpra note 102, at 240.
III. Cardozo, J., in Matter of Rausch, 258 N. Y. 327, 332, 179 N. E. 755, 757 (1932).
I2. Notes (192o) 8 A. L. R. 338; (1883) 43 Am. DEC. 2o5.
113. Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375 (K. B. 1816).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"The principle is that when a person agrees to work upon the farm, or
other business, of another, . . . for a certain time, for a certain sum
to be paid for such labor, and quits the service without cause and with-
out the consent of his employer, before the end of the term agreed upon,
he cannot recover for his work and labor, as upon a quantum meruit.
The special contract must govern, and such contracts are mutual and
are attended with no hardship, for if the employer discharges his serv-
ant without cause, he can recover against him for the whole time agreed
upon." 114
In 1838, in his Institutes, Erskine so declares the law.1 15 The reason for
allowing the servant to recover his full wages when he has been wrongfully
discharged, according to Posey v. Garth, is that "Reciprocal justice requires
that such should be the law of contracts, of this character." 116 It would
seem too clear for argument that if the employee must lose all his wages
when he departs, without justifying cause, before the end of his contract for
hire, the employer should be compelled to pay his entire wages if he dis-
charges him, without justifying cause, before the end of the term.117 The
theory of the doctrine of constructive service is that the readiness of the
employee to perform the services, which the employer prevented, is, in law,
the equivalent of performance, or rather a valid excuse for non-perform-
ance."18
The "great weight of authority" seems to have rejected the doctrine
of constructive service. 119 It has been repudiated in England as well as
by many courts in the United States, which require an employee to forfeit his
wages where he is in default. "Constructive service" has been discarded
as a fiction by the later cases as well as by text writers. 120  Perhaps the
reason most generally assigned for rejecting the doctrine is that it can not be
reconciled with the rule of damages that a person discharged from service
must not remain idle, but must seek employment elsewhere.' 2 ' It is a doc-
trine which instills in discharged employees the spirit of laziness.' 22 In
Illinois, the penalty for breach of contract by the defaulting employee is
forfeiture of the wage earned. But the Illinois court, which had previously
accepted the doctrine of constructive service, later repudiated it as illogical
and unsound because the measure of damages for breach of contract by the
employer is the contract price less what the employee earned or could have
earned.12 3  Such is the mystery of judicial logic in Illinois, as well as in
114. Hansell v. Erickson, 28 II. 257, 258, 259 (1862).
115. Bk. III, tit. iii, § 16.
116. 7 Mo. 94, 95 (1841).
117. Suber v. Vanlew, 2 Spear 126, 127 (S. C. 1843).
xiS. Note (19o7) 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 439, 441.
iig. Note (ig2o) 8 A. L. R. 338, 344.
i2o. Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 369 (1875) ; Note (19o7) 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 439, 451.
121. Note (192o) 8 A. L. R. 338, 347.
122. Note (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. 134.
123. Doherty v. Schipper, 25o Ill. x28, 134, 95 N. E. 74, 75 (91).
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New York, Missouri and other jurisdictions which do not follow the
"cogent reasoning" of Britton v. Turner.
The courts have been in some doubt as to whether an employee who
has been wrongfully discharged must show a constant readiness to perform
the work for which he was employed in order to recover the contract price
for the full term of service.' 24  If the test of reciprocal justice is applied,
there could be no doubt regarding it. If the employee is wrongfully dis-
charged, why should he owe any greater duty to the employer than the
employer owes him when he wrongfully leaves the employment? Reciprocal
justice requires that the employee who is wrongfully discharged should be
permitted to proceed on the original contract for the wages for the whole
term,125 if Britton v. Turner is not to be followed. Under any critical
analysis, the reasons given for repudiating the doctrine of constructive serv-
ice appear fallacious if equality between employee and employer before the
law is assumed.
Yet, so persistent has the common law been in perverting human values
that one reads in a recent official publication from the United States Depart-
ment of Labor 126 that the law of Louisiana is "peculiar" because it allows
the employee who is wrongfully discharged to recover wages for the unex-
pired term at once,127 without reference to his acceptance of other work or
his refusal to return to work under the original contract. What is peculiar
about a statute that allows the employee to recover full wages upon his
wrongful discharge, if by statute he is required to forfeit his wages if he
leaves his employment without just cause? 128 The static character of such
thinking would seem closely akin to mythology, if social solidarity is a cri-
terion of valid legal thinking. It lacks a fruitful insight into concrete
facts.'
29
The Missouri Doctrine
More than forty years ago, Keener pointed out 130 that Missouri had
taken "the unique position" of allowing recovery for part performance
where the conditions had been wilfully broken in the case of a building
124. Note (192o) 8 A. L. R. 338, 347.
125. Rye v. Stubbs, i Hill 384, 386 (S. C. 1833). In those states where the doctrine of
constructive service obtains, an action for wages can not be brought until the expiration of
the term, unless the contract is divisible. (1925) 39 C. J. 92. See also Fowler v. Armour,
24 Ala. 194 (1854); Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299 (1879); American Glucose Co. v.
Lubitz, 71 Ill. App. 638 (1897) ; Williams v. Luckett, 77 Miss. 394, 26 So. 967 (1899) ; cf.
Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381 (N. Y. i86o) ; Tarbox v. Hartenstein, 4 Baxt. 78 (Tenn.
1874).
126. Law Relating to Payment of Wages, Bulletin 408 (1926) 20.
127. Kessee v. Mayfield, 14 La. Ann. 90 (1859) ; Sharp v. McBride, 120 La. 143, 45 So.
41 (19o7); Lurie v. Titcomb, 139 La. 9, 71 So. 2oo (1916); Wells v. Sherrill Hardwood
Lumber Co., 151 La. 1o81, 92 So. 7o6 (1922).
128. Nolan v. Danks, i Rob. 332 (La. 1842) ; Taylor v. Peterson, 9 La. Ann. 251 (1854).
129. Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence (19o7) 19 GRmN BAG 607, 609.
13o. Loc cit. supra note 43.
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contract, while denying it to a defaulting employee. Gregg v. Dunn,13'
which is the case that Keener relied upon, was decided in 1889, just four
years before his pioneer work on Quasi Contracts appeared. The court
admitted that the law in Missouri as to building contracts was "very
peculiar."
"While the law thus favors a mechanic or contractor, and permits
him, in all cases, to sue for and recover the reasonable value of his
work, yet he cannot violate his contract with perfect impunity; when he
does so, the law will deduct from the value of his work whatever damage
the other party has sustained on account of the breach; and in no such
case will he be allowed to recover for a sum in excess of the contract
price." 132
This rule, applied to plumbers, has been felt to be consonant with equity
and to do no injustice to either party to the contract. 133  This peculiarity
of the Missouri law has been said to be due to the fact that the visible and
tangible fruit of the builder's part performance is so realistically presented
to the judicial eye that equity prevails. 134 In Missouri, if one agrees to clear
eleven acres of land and only partially performs, he can recover for part
performance, but the same doctrine does not apply to the employment of a
servant who is hired for a certain period at a fixed sum.' 3
The old rule relating to entire contracts has been modified in Missouri
so as not to apply to builders, painters, plumbers and grubbers.', To do
justice to these vocational interests, the emotional glow of morality is invoked.
"It is, however, generally true in morals, that one who is made richer
by the act of another, done without any purpose of donation on the
part of the latter, and which the former has accepted, ought to recom-
pense the party, at least so far as he himself is a gainer; and the legal
doctrine laid down in Britton v. Turner . . . is, we think, a just appli-
cation of the principle of morality to transactions of this character." 113
This principle of quasi-contracts, which is laid down in Britton v. Turner,
has often been applied with approval to defaulting contractors in Mis-
souri, 138 but the decisions in the state relating to defaulting employees are
131. 38 Mo. App. 283 (I889). Accord: Muller v. Gillick, 66 Mo. App. 500 (1896) ; Hug-
gins v. Hill, 245 S. W. 11o (Mo. App. 1922).
132. Gregg v. Dunn, 38 Mo. App. 283, 288 (1889).
133. Yeats v. Ballantine, 56 Mo. 530, 537 (1874). The rule has been applied to part per-
formance of a contract to paint a building. Fleishmann v. Miller, 38 Mo. App. 177 (1889).
Contra: Maxwell v. Moore, 163 Ala. 490, 5o So. 882 (1909).
134. Note (1924) 24 Coi. L. REv. 885, 888.
135. Lowe v. Sinklear, 27 Mo. 308 (1858); cf. Wahnscaffe v. Pontoja, 63 S. W. 663
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901) ; Hartsell v. Turner, 196 Ala. 299, 71 So. 658 (1916).
136. Lee v. Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378, 385 (851).
137. Downey v. Burke, 23 Mo. 228, 229 (1856).
138. Ibid.; Lamb v. Brolaski, 38 Mo. 51, 53 (1866) ; Yeats v. Ballantine, 56 Mo. 530, 536
(1874).
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adverse to it.' 39 In equity, 140 as well as in law,1 41 in Missouri, the employee
who wilfully fails to perform the conditions of his contract can recover
nothing. When Keener called the position of the Missouri court as to de-
faulting contractors "unique", he obscured the vital issue by the linguistic
camouflage of courtesy.
As early as 1858, Missouri repudiated the doctrine of constructive serv-
ice.1 42 Although now the defaulting employee must forfeit his wages to his
injured employer, to instruct a jury that the defaulting employer must pay
to his discharged employee his wages for the full term is erroneous. 143 Like
New York,14 4 it has approved applying to the defaulting employer that "great
and beneficent rule of law," that the employee, who forfeits to his employer
all his wages when he defaults, must work to reduce his defaulting em-
ployer's damages when he is wrongfully discharged, 145 so that the morals
of employees may not be undermined by voluntary idleness. Such judicial
pronouncements should be regarded as a flagrant abuse of the poetic function
of language.
The Law of Sales
In Britton v. Turner, the court allowed the defaulting employee to re-
cover in quasi-contract the value of the benefit conferred by part perform-
ance, because it felt that such contracts could not be distinguished from sales
contracts. 148  Woodward contended that the analogy relied upon failed, as
none of the cases cited in the opinion involved a wilful breach.'47 Today,
however, it is clear that contracts for the sale of goods are an exception to
the general rule that a quasi-contractual claim will not be raised in favor of
one who has wilfully broken his contract. 48 The Uniform Sales Act pro-
vides that if the buyer has used or disposed of goods delivered before he
knows that the seller is not going to perform his contract in full, he will not
be liable for more than the fair value of the goods received.' 49 Williston
says:
"It is true that it has often been laid down that a contract will not be
implied by the law in favor of one who is in default under an express
139. Yeats v. Ballantine, 56 Mo. 530 (1874).
140. Paul v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co., 87 Mo. App. 647 (igoi).
141. Henson v. Hampton, 32 Mo. 408 (1862) ; Aaron v. Moore, 34 Mo. 79 (1863) ; Earp
v. Tyler, 73 Mo. 617 (1881).
142. Ream v. Watkins, 27 Mo. 516 (1858).
143. Id. at 517.
144. Howard v. Daly, 6I N. Y. 362, 373 (1875).
145. Pond v. Wyman, X5 Mo. 175 (1851); Gruetzner v. Aude Furniture Co., 28 Mo. App.
263 (1887) ; Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W. 151 (1895) ; Tenzer v.
Gilmore, 114 Mo. App. 210, 89 S. W. 341 (1905) ; Puller v. Royal Casualty Co., 271 Mo. 369,
196 S. W. 755 (1917) ; Osterman v. St. Louis Fish & Oyster Co., 218 S. W. 410 (Mo. App.
1920).
146. 6 N. H. at 489.
147. Op. cit. supra note 12, § 17o (c).
148. Ballantine, supra note 42, at 335.
149. § 44.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
contract, but the injustice of allowing the buyer to retain the benefit
of goods without paying for them is so clear that even in England,
where quasi-contractual rights are generally most strictly limited, recov-
ery has been allowed, and the weight of authority in the United States
strongly supports this view . . . ., 0
Indeed, the Uniform Sales Act has been adopted by thirty-one states, many
of which deny to the defaulting employee any recovery. 151
It is not the policy of the law to impose punitive damages for the breach
of commercial contracts, except where the circumstances render the breach
of duty so flagrant as to be tantamount to a tort.152  Why should a seller
who has wilfully broken his contract be allowed to recover the reasonable
value of the goods delivered, while the employee is denied the right to recover
for the benefits with which his labor enriches his employer? 153 That question
was asked by the Kansas court over fifty years ago in Duncan v. Baker.154
Missouri courts can not distinguish between building contracts and contracts
for the sale of material. 155 Both types of contracts are governed by the
same law. The Missouri courts do distinguish, however, between contracts
for the sale of material and contracts for the sale of labor.156 To the detri-
ment of the employee, the law is different. In I92O, Mr. Justice Swayse,
relying upon the same analogy upon which Britton v. Turner relied, thought
that it was of some consequence that contracts to sell and contracts for work
and labor should be governed by the same legal principles.'"1 Cooley re-
minds us that the upper class is institutional in its very essence, since it is the
control of institutions that makes it the upper class. Successful business
men, lawyers, politicians and editors identify themselves with commercial
ideals. 158  Only the mental lethargy of the laboring class can account for
the persistence of the mythical morality that has been judicially expounded,
which is so at variance with the spirit of fair play.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts
Much of what has been said may have seemed painfully obvious. In-
deed, it might be regarded as superfluous if the American Law Institute
had not attempted to rehabilitate the theory of the condition precedent in the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts '9 and to endow it with all its ancient
15o. 2 WILIISTON, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 460. See also 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
§ 1474.
151. WooDivARD, loc. cit. supra note 12; cf. id. § 176 (3), § 174 (I).
152. Note (1924) 24 COL. L. RFV. 885, 891.
153. Ballantine, supra note 42, at 335.
154. 21 Kan. 99, io8 (878).
155. Halpin Mfg. Co. v. School Dist., 54 Mo. App. 371, 379 (1893).
156. See Note of Commissioners, CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr § 19.
157. Englander v. Abrahamson-Kaplan Co., 94 N. J. L. 25, 27, 1O9 Atl. 307, 308 (1920).
158. CooIsm", SocrAL. ORGANIZATION (1927) 140. See also Pound, supra note 5o, at 487;
HowERTn, WORK AND LirE (1913) 127.
159. § 270 (1932).
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vigor. To illustrate the application of the condition precedent, the Restate-
ment invokes the employee as its victim. Its comment tells us that
"Centuries ago the practice became settled that where work is to
be done by one party to the contract, and payment is to be made by the
other, the performance of the work, when no relative times for the
performances are specified in the contract, must precede the pay-
ment .... "
"Centuries ago" must have been in the age of feudalism. If not, at least
that orthodox principle of contracts antedates the democratic movement of
the last century.' 60  In all humanistic studies, says Malinowsky, there is a
strong temptation to play with dead remains instead of grappling with
actuality.' 61 In the present social order, the civilized world has focused
attention upon the welfare of labor.162 Although theorists may refuse to
be hampered by facts, the struggle for equality before the law between the
employer and the employee will continue.163 Dean Pound has aptly said that
reverence for institutions of the past will not preserve an institution that
touches everyday life as profoundly as does the law.'6 4
One may find cogent reasons for quarreling with particular generaliza-
tions of the Restatement.65 As long as punitive damages are not recover-
able from the employer for his wilful breach of contract,' 6" while wrong-
fully discharged employees are required by reasonable diligence to reduce the
damages of the defaulting employer 167 and to forfeit their wages for their
own default, the restatement of the condition precedent may be regarded
as a simplification of the law, but it can scarcely be said to clarify it or to
adapt it to social needs so as to secure the better administration of justice.168
Dean Clark has said that simplification of the law as an end in itself is false.
It may be a generality so vague and antiquated as to represent merely an
unchallenged statement of past history. If that ideal hampers and stulti-
fies,169 the courts will quickly repudiate it. When there are social and eco-
nomic claims which legislation seeks to satisfy, the logical and dogmatic
demands of judicial law can not overcome them despite the paralyzing in-
fluence of the past.
i6o. POUND, The New Feudalhsm (193o) 16 A. B. A. J. 553, 558.
i61. MALINOvSKY, CULTURE (1927) 26.
162. MENDELSOHN, SATURATED CIVILIZATION (1926) 104.
163. GoMPERs, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE (1919) 21.
164. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (19o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 6o6.
165. Grismore, Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 31 Micr. L. REV. 741.
166. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs (1932) § 342.
167. Id. § 336.
x68. Id. at p. viii.
i69. Clark, Thw Restateitent of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 643, 653,
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Legislation
The law existing in England at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution of the United States regulating the employment of servants and
laborers was of ancient origin.1 70  Modern legislation relating to their em-
ployment undoubtedly rests upon different political and economic principles.
It is characterized by a conscious effort to remove the servile and parental
vestiges of the master and servant stage and to substitute therefor a real
equality.' 7 1  In Louisiana, the default of the employer incurs the same
penalty as the default of the employee. 1 72  In Alberta, a similar attempt
has been made to penalize equally the delinquency of employer and employee
for a breach of the contract of employment.
1 73
In 19oo, Mississippi passed an act which made it a misdemeanor for
certain laborers who were employed in writing for less than a year to leave
their employment without the consent of the employer and to make a second
contract without giving notice of the first contract to the second employer.
The statute was held to be unconstitutional.-7 4  "There is nothing in the law
aimed at the other party to the contract, called his employer," said the court.
The citizens who were liable to prosecution under the statute belonged
to the class of the humble and the poor. Although among the weak, the pro-
tection of their right was considered none the less important. Such an
abridgement of liberty could not be confined to farm laborers. A similar
statute was held unconstitutional by Alabama in 19o4. 1' 5 Since Bailey v.
Alabama,1 76 which was decided in 191o by the Supreme Court of the United
States, it is clear that a statute under the pretense of punishing fraud cannot
expose to conviction for crime the failure or refusal to perform a contract
for personal service in liquidation of a debt because it contravenes the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
1 7
7
In Stark v. Parker,'17  Mr. Justice Lincoln thought that the rule which
required an employee to forfeit his wages if he abandoned his service would
hold out no inducement to the employer to drive the laborer from his em-
ployment or to oppress him. Within a half century thereafter, Massachu-
setts instituted legislation to guarantee to employees the payment of their
170. Opinion o.f the Justices, 163 Mass. 589, 592, 40 N. E. 713, 715 (895).
171. COMMON AND ANDREwS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1927) 36.
172. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart 1932) §§ 2749, 2750. See also cases cited notes 127, 128,
supra; ARK. DIG. (1921) § 6885.
173. ALBERTA REv. STAT. (1922) C. 180.
174. State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 794, 799, 6o So. 778, 779, 78o (1912).
175. Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332 (1904).
176. 219 U. S. 219 (igio), rev'g 161 Ala. 75 (1909). See also Jaremillo v. Romero, I
N. M. 19o (1857).
177. In United States v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133, 150 (914), Holmes, J., thought that
there was nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment which prevents a state from making a breach
of contract for labor a crime and punishing it as such. See also Taylor v. United States, 244
Fed. 321 (1917).
178. 2 Pick. 267, 275 (Mass. 1824).
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*wages.179  Legislation of this type was designed to protect the weaker party
because of the disadvantage of his position.1 80 In view of the amiable atti-
tude of Mr. Justice Lincoln, it is informing to note the five reasons for the
non-payment of wages disclosed in a recent survey of the state labor offices
of the United States.18 ! Those reasons are:
i. Inadequate wage-payment legislation.
2. Personal disagreement between the employers and employees, some-
times resulting in discharge or quitting the job.
3. Lack of principle on the part of employers.
4. Lack of understanding as to rates of pay.
5- Insufficient capital for business projects, financial reverses or insolv-
ency.
The first three reasons assigned for the non-payment of wages do not justify
the optimism of the Vassachusetts court more than a century before.
The failure of employers to pay wages due their employees is recognized
as a serious and widespread evil.18 2 In some states, complaints of the non-
payment of wages are made to State Labor Departments by the thousands
annually.' 8 3 In Colorado, in 1930, men, women and children employed in
the sugar beet fields, whose earnings averaged less than $165 a year, were
unable to recover the wages due them. 8 4 Many of them became dependent
upon charity. To relieve them of their distress, the Commission recom-
mended that wages for labor in the beet fields be made a charge upon the
crop. In California, the state labor office settled 16,121 claims of the 27,813
claims for wages which came to the attention of the office in 1926, collecting
$976,368. In 1929, it collected $1,051,925 from the 17,966 claims which
were settled of the 28,419 claims for wages which it handled.'8 5 If the
other states had as effective an administration of similar wage settlement
statutes, the exploitation of human labor would soon cease to be a social
evil. The common laborer and farm hand so frequently have difficulty in
collecting their wages that it has often seemed incredible that some similar
inexpensive method of collecting wages of employees should not be provided
without compelling them to resort to the technical and costly process of
bringing suit in civil courts.'8 6
Courts have often been called upon to pass on the constitutionality of a
statute which imposes upon the defaulting employer a penalty for non-pay-
179. Smith, Administrative Justice (1923) 18 IL.T L. RLv. 211, 218.
i8o. Supra note 126, at i.
18I. Collection of Wages (1930) 31 LAB. REv. 86, 877. The order of the reasons are
here rearranged for purpose of reference.
182. Id. at 869.
183. Id. at 878.
184. Am. CHILD (Oct., 1931) 3.
I85. Supra note 181, at 870, 871.
186. Smith, supra note 179, at 22o.
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ment of wages, where the penalty is so excessive as to be out of all proportion
to the actual damage suffered.'18  Although the question is the same as that
involved in the forfeiture of all wages earned by the defaulting employee
under the orthodox rule of the condition precedent, such statutes have been
held to deny to the employer the equal protection of the law. 18 Illinois,
which has consistently refused to allow the defaulting employee to recover,
declared unconstitutional a statute which required commercial corporations
to pay weekly wages under a penalty of fifty dollars.1 89 In its tender regard
for the laborer, the court glorified the dignity of labor.190 The year pre-
vious to this Illinois decision, Rhode Island held such a statute constitu-
tional,1 91 although it was denounced as the worst kind of class legislation.
1 92
For more than a generation, legislatures have been extremely active in
passing laws relating to the contracts between employer and employee, espe-
cially those involving wages.1 93  The Illinois court declared unconstitutional
the "Truck Store" Act, which required the payment of wages in lawful
money, because the legislature was not justified in making such discrimina-
tions as favoritism and caprice might dictate. 9 4  Twenty years ago, Dean
Pound said, in criticising this decision, that modern labor legislation had
recognized that the necessities of the laborer often placed him at the mercy
of the employer and that the inequality could not be perpetuated under the
guise of freedom of contract. 195 Sound policy made the payment of laborers
a matter of public concern. That fact is so patent that even the Bankruptcy
Act gives preference to the wages of workmen and servants, not to exceed
$300, if earned within three months of the commencement of the proceed-
ings.' 96 In Indiana, the employee can not waive his right to demand pay-
ments at designated intervals. 197
Legislation regulating the payment of wages has been common, what-
ever may have been its purpose.198 Many states have enacted laws which
direct the payment of wages monthly, semimonthly or weekly. These stat-
utes may be of general application, or they may be restricted to corporations
187. Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 612, 614.
188. Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N. E. 761 (1922); Davidow v.
WAVadworth Mfg. Co., 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776 (I92O).
i89. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62 (1893).
19o. Id. at 71, 35 N. E. at 63.
191. State v. Brown, 18 R. I. 16, 25 Atl. 246 (1892). See also Leep v. Railway Co., 58
Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 75 (1894) ; Saint Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 40 S. W.
705 (897), aff'd, 173 13. S. 404 (1899). On the invalidity of allowance of attorney's fee to
laborer, see Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897), three judges dissenting.
192. State v. Brown, 18 R. I. 16, 33, 25 Atl. 246, 253 (1892).
193. State v. Martin, 193 Ind. 120, 122, 139 N. E. 282, 283 (1923). See also Note (193o)
43 HAnv. L. Rav. 647.
194. Frorer v. People, 141 II. 171, 186, 31 N. E. 395, 399 (1892).
195. Pound, supra note 50, at 473, 486.
196. 34 STAT. 267 (1906), ii U. S. C. A. § 104 (1927).
197. Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 23 N. E. 253 (1899).
198. Supra note 126, at 42 et seq.
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or to certain classes of corporations.10 In many states, specified employers
are required by statute to pay immediately upon discharge all wages which
may be due the employee.20 0  In Wisconsin, such payment of wages must be
made by certain employers regardless of whether the employee leaves the
employment or is discharged. 201  Although such legislation may not be of
general application, it has nullified in part at least the gross injustice due
to forfeiture of wages under the condition precedent. Of course, if em-
ployees not in default are unable to collect wages earned because of the cost
of litigation, the mere absence of reported cases instituted by defaulting
employees to recover in spite of their default does not indicate the absence of
a social problem, because even general legislation for the payment of wages
often exempts from its operation certain classes of laborers.
The Social Background
The social attitude toward labor in any society creates the legal status
of its laboring masses. 20 2  The class atmosphere in which men live deter-
mines the premises of their thought.20 3 The early relation between master
and servant in England was largely one of dependency on the part of the
latter. Even when the basis of that relationship became contractual, the
subjection of the servant remained.20 4  Fictitious values and conventional
ideas which are rooted in outworn traditions still prevail; the received ideals
of the feudal era have survived the Industrial Revolution. But a change in
the political center of gravity is emancipating labor from bondage. 20 5
The rise of labor in the last quarter of the nineteenth century from its
degradation in the old social order marks an evolutionary process in prog-
ress.206 In England, a laborer struggling to improve his condition was con-
fronted until 1813 with laws limiting the amount of wages he might de-
mand.20 7 Chitty tells us that statutes placed servants in husbandry, laborers
and those in particular trades under salutary regulations. 208  By a statute
of George IV, persons under a contract to labor who did not fulfil it accord-
ing to its terms were subject to a penalty of three months in the House of
Correction,20  Dicey says that their discontent with their miserable con-
dition was so widespread that it is recorded in a series of state trials for
sedition, for conspiracy and for treason, extending from 1832 to 1843.210
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id. at 20.
201. Wis. REv. STAT. (1933) § 103.39.
2o2. Lederer, Labor (1932) 8 ENCYC. Soc. ScIENcEs 615, 617.
203. COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL ORDER (1922) 72.
204. Seagle, Labor Law (1932) 8 ENCYC. Soc. ScICEs 672.
205. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION OF PHILOSOPHY (1920) 43.
206. MENDELSOEN, oP. cit. supra note 162, at 97.
207. Brandeis, I., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 357 (1921).
208. I CHITTY, PRACTICE OF THE LAW (Ist Am. ed. 1834) 72.
209. 4 GEo. IV, c. 34, § 3 (1823).
210. DIcEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND (1914) 212.
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The social hierarchy was but a symbol of the old feudal habits that still
controlled national life, gave form to social values and furnished the requisite
emotional resonance. 2 t- Of course, it was the governing class which had a
controlling influence in shaping legal rules.
212
In France, as well as elsewhere, the most characteristic legislation of
the nineteenth century was that regulating the relation of master and
servant.21 3  Prior to 1868, under the French Civil Code,214 the master was
to be believed, upon his affirmation, as to the amount of wages, as to the
payment of salary for the year elapsed and as to installments paid for the
current year. It was not until 1890 that a discharged employee could obtain
damages for a dismissal abusively given. 215  Today, a system of progressive
legislation accords protection to the workman, who previously had been the
victim of economic anarchy.
Labor unions have arisen out of the urgent need of self-defense. The
most obvious need to counteract the pressure of the employing interests in
influencing legislation and administration to their advantage is class-con-
sciousness.2 16  In the absence of competing ideas,2 17 the ritualism of tradi-
tion will supplant reality; legalism will triumph over justice.
Equality Before the Law
Ever since the American Revolution there has been a growing and
well-founded faith that democratic principles are permeating our institutions.
The principle of equality has evolved into a juristic ideal of equal justice in a
civil state.2 18  "Equality before the law" has come to be regarded the first
and most essential kind of equality,21 9 since it signifies an integration of
national life. It represents a reaction to the idea of privilege. To assume
that precedents derived from general principles of English law are of uni-
versal applicability and can be applied with justice to contracts of employ-
ment is fallacious. 220 Dicey says:
"The most ordinary knowledge of the commonest events shows us that
in i8oo the government of England was essentially aristocratic, and
211. DEVEY, THE MAN AND His PHILOSOPHY (1930) 76.
212. WILTISTOx, op. cit. supra note 19, at 14; CooLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1927) 308.
See also Turner v. Mason, 14 M1. & W. 112 (Ex. 1845) ; cf. Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex. Supp.
456 (186o).
213. Charmont, The Conflict of Interest Legally Protected in Frentch Civil Law (1919)
13 ILL. L. Rav. 693, 695.
214. Art. 1781.
215. Charmont, supra note 213, at 696.
216. CooLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1927) 286.
217. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 26o, 157 N. E. 130 (1927);
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928) ; State v. Julow,
129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895).
218. HoLcOMBE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN COMMONWEALTH (1923) 205.
219. RITCHIE, NATUIAL RIGHTS (1894) 255; cf. (1908) 66 CENT. L. J. 135, 137; WELLS,
THE WAY THE WORLD Is GOING (1929) 55.
220. Hale, Labor Law, Anglo-American (1932) 8 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCES 667.
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that the class which, though never despotic, was decidedly dominant,
was the class of landowners and of large merchants; and that the
social conditions, the feelings and convictions of Englishmen in i8oo,
were even more aristocratic than were English political institutions." 221
If social and economic equality can not be maintained, at least there
should not be such inequality before the law as to violate the reasonable
expectations of the laboring masses who are employed. To create a per-
manent gulf between legal thought and popular thought is to make law a
pseudo-science. 222  The first step in ameliorating the ceaseless struggle be-
tween employer and employed is to establish confidence in the tribunals which
are empowered to adjudicate their differences. For courts to proclaim that
they do not and should not take sides in that ceaseless struggle 223 is mean-
ingless if their decisions clearly indicate a perverted sense of justice.
One may resort for a moment to facts. In 19oo, there were 443 manu-
facturing establishments in the United States, each of which had over IOOO
employees. In one mill in New York, there were 2689 persons employed. 224
In the absence of legislation requiring the payment of wages weekly, if any
one of the 2689 employees had broken his contract of employment, judicial
morality in New York would have required penalizing the employee for his
delinquency by a forfeiture of his wages for the wage period in which the
default occurred. But if the corporate employer were the defaulting party,
judicial justice would have required mere reparation. At the close of the
decade in which Britton v. Turner was decided, there were 17,826 persons
engaged in manufacturing in the United States.225  Less than a century
later, 8,838,743 wage earners were employed in 210,959 manufacturing
establishments. Of these, 6,257,165 persons were engaged by 16,753 em-
ployers.226 In the absence of mitigating wage-payment legislation and its
attending practices, reparation would, under the orthodox rule of contracts,
have been the rule of damages applied to the 16,ooo employers if any one
of them had been guilty of a breach of contract of employment. But if any
one of the 6,ooo,ooo employees had voluntarily abandoned his contract of
employment, he would have forfeited what he had earned regardless of the
damages his employer had suffered. One ought to be able to understand
what the court meant in Britton v. Turner, when it said:
221. LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND (i914) 48; cf. LASKI, STUDIES IN LAW AND
POLTICS (1932) 107; WLLSTON, op. cit. supra note 19, at II.
222. Pound, supra note 129, at 611; cf. Brandeis, 3., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U. S. 312, 357 (921).
223. Crane, J., dissenting in Exchange Bakery & Restaurant Co. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 26o,
271, 157 N. E. 13o, 135 (1927) ; Engelmeyer v. Simon, 148 Misc. 62r, 623, 265 N. Y. Supp.
636, 640 (1933).
224. TWELFTH CENSUS, I90O, Manufactures, pt. I, lxxiv.
225. CENSUS OF i85o, lxxx.
226. FIFTEENT31 CENSUS, i93O, Manufactures, 1:42.
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" . . . the general understanding of the community is, that the hired
laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually per-
formed, though he do not continue the entire term contracted
for . . 227
The sentiment does credit to the courts which have shared it.228 In an equal
administration of the law, society has an interest which democratic sentiment
has quickened, although the impulses which gave birth to it may have been
obstructed by centuries of tradition.
229
The Constitutional Question
To be scientific, the law must be responsive to the demand for equal
justice.230  In Truax v. Corrigan, Taft, C. J., said that our whole system
of law was predicated on the general, fundamental principle of "equality of
application" of the law. 23 1  Counsel for the employer has often argued that
to allow a defaulting employee to recover would impair the obligation of con-
tract which is held sacred by the federal and state constitutions. 232  Courts
which have applied reparation as the rule of damages to the defaulting
employer have sustained the argument and made forfeiture the rule of
damages for the employee. If "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
protection of equal laws",233 it seems that it has no application to defaulting
employees. Yet the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent an
arbitrary spoliation of property.
234
Classification may be the most inveterate of our reasoning processes.23 5
But to be a valid constitutional classification, it must be reasonable. 23 6 There
must be some justification for any discrimination. If the guaranty of equal
protection does not warrant less favorable treatment of defaulting em-
ployers, why should the law be more severe in its treatment of the class less
favored by fortune and circumstance? Clearly, the uniform application
of the condition precedent to defaulting employer and employee alike is
unjust discrimination 237 because it is not "equality of application."
Indeed, the application of that common law rule to contracts involving
the employer-employee relation was clearly unsuited to the democratic con-
227. 6 N. H. at 493.
228. Parcell v. McComber, ii Neb. 209, 211, 7 N. W. 529, 530 (i88) ; cf. Loyd, supra
note 79, at 128.
229. Pound, supra note 5o, at 481.
230. Pound, supra note 164, at 6o5.
231. 257 U. S. 312, 332 (1921).
232. Badgley v. Heald, 9 Ill. 64, 65 (1847).
233. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1885).
234. Barber v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885).
235. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 337 (1921).
236. BURDICK, LA w OF AmEIcAN CONSTrrUTION (1922) § 279. See also (1929) 2 DAIC.
L. REV. 399, 400.
237. Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 217, 89 N. W. 522, 527 (1902).
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ditions which our constitutions and laws have sought to preserve. Generally,
the common law of England was not recognized in the American states so
far as it was repugnant to the policy of our laws or inconsistent with the
spirit of free institutions. 238  Not only the difference of political conditions
justified its modification, but public sentiment often demanded its repudia-
tion.23 9  Kansas repudiated the application of the condition precedent to
contracts of labor because it violated both the spirit and the purpose of the
bill of rights.240 The rule applied to labor under the social conditions of
pre-Victorian England can not be deemed to be in keeping either with the
habits of thought in this republic or in harmony with the objects of our legal
institutions.
Conclusion
If, as Lord Scrutton has said, the whole history of the action for money
had and received may properly be called "a history of well-meaning sloppi-
ness of thought," 241 the defender of quasi-contractual relief can justly reply
that such judicial sloppiness may not be in any degree comparable to the
judicial obtuseness employed in mechanically applying the doctrine of the
condition precedent to defaulting employees. Social justice is not an emo-
tional manifestation. The vice in applying one rule of damages to the
employee and another to the employer, when both are wilful defaulters,
can not be concealed by the veneer of rationalization nor can its weakness be
camouflaged by conventional morality. The ideal of the law ought not to
depend upon whether it is the employer or the employee who is seeking
justice.
242
If the defaulting seller can recover the reasonable price of such part of
his goods as he has delivered, should not labor as a commodity be valued
as highly as are goods in the scale of judicial values? The protective majesty
of the law can not so pervert common sense as to exalt permanently com-
mercial values above personal service values. It is not at all likely that those
states which have followed Britton v. Turner will revert to the common law
rule adopted by the Restatement of Contracts. The struggle between the
employer and employee for equality before the law is becoming too tense to
admit of a reversion to the formalism of the condition precedent so far as
it is applied to contracts of personal service. Labor is now on the offensive.
The constant appeal to uniformity was but a dialectic device to give prestige
to the dogma of the condition precedent. That dogma ought never to have
238. Conant v. Jordan, 1O7 Me. 227, 234, 77 Atl. 938, 94I (i9io) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Brucker, 205 Ind. 273, 277, 183 N. E. 668, 67o (1933).
239. Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 78, 8o N. E. 665, 667 (i9o7).
240. Cooper v. Seaverns, 8i Kan. 267, 281, 284, IO5 Pac. 509, 512 (19o9). See also Cun-
ningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 305 (1869).
241. Holt v. Markham, [1923] 1 K. B. 504, 513.
242. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systemns of Law (1933) 7
TuLANe L. REv. 475, 486.
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been applied to contracts of labor to the enrichment of the employer in a
nation where the dignity of labor is glorified, and where equality before the
law is deemed a constitutional virtue. By legislation, the evil of its applica-
tion has been modified, but not nullified. After a hundred years of contro-
versy, Britton v. Turner stands approved by considerations of morality,
equality and social solidarity. Only the classic doctrine of contracts con-
demns it.
